Learning in unprofitable games
研究了在无利可图博弈中，演化和学习过程是否会导致纳什均衡行为，发现纯纳什均衡和纯最大最小策略不稳定，而混合纳什均衡和量化反应均衡可能成为吸引子或排斥子。
A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For a class of 3 × 3 games we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play. We find that neither the pure Nash equilibrium nor the pure maximin strategy are stable rest points under the studied dynamics whereas the mixed Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium may be attractors, repellors or surrounded by periodic orbits.