Competitive outcomes in a Cournot-Tullock contest
将N人塔洛克竞赛的奖品价值内生化，视为线性反需求下古诺竞争的市场总收入。竞赛设计者通过选择参数可实现完全竞争结果，而最大化参与者收益的参数则导致产出为完全竞争的一半。
I endogenise the value of the prize in an N -player Tullock contest as the total market revenue obtained in Cournot competition under linear inverse demand. The contest designer, by choosing the parameter relating players’ outputs to their share of market revenue, can maximise total surplus by implementing the perfectly competitive outcome. In contrast, the parameter that maximises players’ payoffs leads them to produce one-half of the perfectly competitive output, which is equivalent to 1 / N of the monopoly output.