Financial misconduct and bank risk-taking: Evidence from US banks
研究发现美国银行因金融不当行为受到监管处罚后，风险承担水平上升，且CEO权力大、机构投资者持股比例高会加剧这一效应，而董事会规模大、年龄大、独立性强、性别多元化等则能缓解。
We test for a link between bank risk-taking and regulatory enforcements against US banks for financial misconduct. Misconduct-related enforcements are associated with increased bank risk-taking on several measures of risk, and there is some evidence that the impact of enforcements on risk-taking is accentuated in the presence of powerful CEOs and a higher proportion of institutional investor ownership and mitigated when executive boards are larger, older, more independent, more gender diverse, busier, and where independent directors are relatively inexperienced. The results are robust to alternative measures of bank risk-taking, and alternative estimation techniques, including controlling for endogeneity bias.