Structural lobbying power? An exploration of patterns in preference attainment at varying levels of lobbying activity
研究了利益集团在不同游说活动水平下（包括不游说或很少游说）的政治目标达成情况，发现大型组织即使游说很少也能获得更高偏好达成，且在新冠疫情期间商业集团和经济重要部门存在优势。
Abstract Studies of lobbying typically look at the extent to which interest groups realize political goals on issues they actively lobby for. Little is known, however, about the extent to which interest groups attain their political goals without making an active lobbying effort. In this paper, we analyze potential biases in perceived preference attainment at different levels of lobbying activity, including analyses among organizations which do not, or hardly, lobby. Empirically, we rely on a cross‐national survey conducted among interest group leaders in 8 polities in Europe during the Covid‐19 pandemic. Our dataset includes information about issue mobilization and perceived preference attainment on Covid‐19 policies and non‐Covid‐related policies. We find that larger organizations enjoy higher levels of perceived preference attainment, even when they lobby little. In the Covid‐19 case, we also see biases in favor of business groups and economically more important sectors. These results document a form of structural power, where decision‐making automatically favors some economically important interests.