🌙

基于博弈行为的共识模型:最大化线性二次收益与最小化调整

Game Behavior-Driven Consensus Models With Maximum Linear-Quadratic Payoffs and Minimum Adjustment

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems · 2025
被引 6
ABS 3

中文导读

研究利用网络博弈和Stackelberg博弈架构,构建了一个共识模型,使协调者通过补偿策略和反馈建议引导决策者达成共识,同时决策者调整意见以最大化自身收益。

Abstract

Interaction behaviors play a core role in the process of reaching a consensus. In this article, a network game is employed to model the interplay between the behaviors of decision makers (DMs) and Stackelberg game architecture is used to design an interactive mechanism between the DMs and the moderator. An optimization model based on these two games results in a consensus model with maximum linear-quadratic payoffs and minimum adjustment (MPMACM). In the proposed MPMACM, the moderator provides compensation strategies and feedback suggestions to guide the DMs to reach the desired consensus level with minimum adjustment, while the DMs adjust their opinions aiming to obtain their maximum payoffs. We present the equilibrium analysis for the MPMACM, and an adaptive differential evolution algorithm is offered to enact this optimization model. Finally, an example application is conducted to illustrate and justify the performance of the MPMACM.

共识模型博弈论网络博弈优化算法决策行为