Auditor Scrutiny of Loan Loss Estimates and Bank Lending: Evidence from PCAOB Inspections
研究审计师对贷款损失准备的审查是否影响银行贷款决策，发现审查促使银行减少同质贷款（如住房抵押贷款），表明审计监管可间接影响信贷行为。
ABSTRACT We examine whether auditor scrutiny over the allowance for loan losses (ALL) is associated with bank lending decisions. Using PCAOB inspection findings over the ALL to capture increases in auditor scrutiny, we find that auditor scrutiny is associated with a larger ALL for homogeneous loans (i.e., residential mortgages and consumer loans) but not for heterogeneous loans (i.e., commercial real estate; commercial and industrial loans). We next find that auditor scrutiny is associated with a shift in lending away from homogeneous loans, consistent with auditor scrutiny reducing the relative attractiveness of homogeneous loans. These findings suggest that policymakers and audit regulators can indirectly affect bank lending by exercising their authority in ways that affect auditor scrutiny. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources discussed in the paper. JEL Classifications: G21; M42; M48.