Procurement with competing insiders
研究了在锦标赛拍卖中引入多个竞争内幕者和风险厌恶因素如何影响最优投标行为，发现增加内幕者数量会显著降低高于估值的投标，而风险厌恶则相反但影响较弱。
The tournament auction is a novel approach to studying procurement in which a group of entrants compete for the chance to face a strong incumbent, or insider. I introduce competing insiders and risk aversion to this form of procurement auction and analyse how these factors affect optimal bidding behaviour. Increasing the number of strong insiders significantly decreases the degree of above-value bidding that is present with a single insider. In contrast, risk aversion increases above-value bidding relative to risk neutrality, but has a weaker effect than the number of insiders on bidding behaviour. Therefore, even with risk-averse bidders, bids eventually approach bidders’ values when the number of insiders grows large. • Competing insiders and risk aversion are introduced into the tournament auction. • Above-value bidding decreases in the number of strong insiders. • In contrast, risk aversion increases above-value bidding. • The number of strong insiders has a greater effect on bidding than risk aversion. • Bids, therefore, approach values when the number of insiders grows large.