Dismantling a market for stolen goods: Evidence from the regulation of junkyards in Brazil
研究2014年巴西圣保罗州对废品场的监管如何减少汽车盗窃，发现监管使汽车盗窃下降8.11%，并降低了车辆保险价格，表明市场监管可作为打击赃物交易的有效策略。
This paper investigates the impact of monitoring and market regulation on the illicit market for stolen goods, focusing on the association between junkyards and auto theft. I explore the effects of a state-level regulation implemented in São Paulo in 2014, which enhanced supervision of the market for auto parts. I find an 8.11% decline in auto theft for municipalities presenting at least one junkyard specialized in auto parts compared to the control group. Additionally, I provide evidence of a meaningful decrease in vehicle insurance prices, suggesting tangible economic benefits for citizens as a result of lower crime rates. These findings offer crucial insights into market regulation as a crime deterrence strategy to reduce the trade of stolen goods, highlighting its complementarity with traditional public security policies.