Public Liquidity and Financial Crises
研究了公共流动性供给如何影响金融危机：更多公共流动性可减轻危机严重性并扩大银行信贷，但会挤占银行存款并增加银行对实际冲击的脆弱性。量化解释了40%的国债流动性溢价变动，并发现QE1对产出的改善效果是QE3的20倍，但QE政策会加剧银行对非金融冲击（如新冠疫情）的脆弱性。
This paper studies the equilibrium effect of public liquidity on financial crises. Banks borrow from households via insured deposits and partially runnable debt and suffer endogenous funding withdrawals from households in crises. Holding public liquidity alleviates banks’ liquidity problems. In equilibrium, a larger public liquidity supply reduces crisis severity and expands bank lending but crowds bank deposits and increases bank vulnerability to real shocks. The model quantitatively explains 40 percent of Treasury liquidity premium variations. Counterfactual analyses reveal that QE1 significantly improves output, 20 times larger than QE3. However, QE policies raise bank fragility against nonfinancial shocks such as COVID-19.