Super‐Nash Performance
提出博弈中的新基准“超纳什表现”和求解概念“optimin”，玩家在他人单方面有利偏离下最大化自身最低收益，且每个纳什均衡都存在一个optimin使玩家获得并保证超纳什收益。
ABSTRACT In this paper, I introduce a novel benchmark in games, super‐Nash performance , and a solution concept, optimin , whereby players maximize their minimal payoff under unilateral profitable deviations by other players. Optimin achieves super‐Nash performance in that, for every Nash equilibrium, there exists an optimin where each player not only receives but also guarantees super‐Nash payoffs under unilateral profitable deviations by others. Furthermore, optimin generalizes Nash equilibrium in ‐person constant‐sum games and coincides with it when . Finally, optimin is consistent with the direction of non‐Nash deviations in games in which cooperation has been extensively studied.