A market mechanism for sustainable and efficient resource use under uncertainty
提出一种市场机制，在不确定性下分配自然资源使用权，同时实现可持续性和效率最大化，尤其适用于发展中国家与远洋捕鱼船队的渔业协议。
Sustainability and efficiency are potentially conflicting social objectives in natural resource management. We propose a market mechanism to allocate use rights over a stochastic resource to private managers, which is particularly parsimonious with respect to governing and monitoring institutions on which many traditional rights-based management practices rest. The mechanism endogenously determines the maximal tenure length guaranteeing sustainability over the entire period. In addition, the mechanism achieves efficiency, i.e ., it maximizes the expected present value of resource rents that accrue to society. Potential applications include improved fishing agreements between developing countries and distant-water fishing fleets.