Industrial Policy Implementation: Empirical Evidence from China’s Shipbuilding Industry
利用1998-2014年企业数据评估中国造船业产业政策效果，发现政策虽提升市场份额但回报低、导致产能过剩，不同工具效果差异大，强调企业异质性和商业周期在设计中的关键作用。
Abstract Industrial policies are widely used across the world. In practice, designing and implementing these policies is a complicated task. In this paper, we assess the long-term performance of different industrial policy instruments, which include production subsidies, investment subsidies, entry subsidies, and consolidation policies. To do so, we examine a recent industrial policy in China aiming to propel the country’s shipbuilding industry to the largest globally. Using firm-level data from 1998 to 2014 and a dynamic model of firm entry, exit, investment, and production, we find that (i) the policy boosted China’s domestic investment, entry, and international market share dramatically, but delivered low returns and led to fragmentation, idle capacity, as well as depressed world ship prices; (ii) the effectiveness of different policy instruments is mixed: production and investment subsidies can be justified by market share considerations, while entry subsidies are wasteful; (iii) counter-cyclical policies, firm-targeting, and shortening the intervention horizon can substantially reduce distortions. Our results highlight the critical role of firm heterogeneity, business cycles, and firms’ cost structure in policy design. Finally, when exploring potential rationales, we find support for nonclassical considerations, such as reducing freight rates to boost Chinese trade.