Sovereign Spreads and the Political Leaning of Nations
研究发现，更倾向于选举左翼政府的国家，其主权利差更高且波动更大。通过构建包含选举的主权违约模型，解释了左倾经济体因财政紧缩意愿较低、政府支出较高而导致利差上升和福利下降的机制。
ABSTRACT Nations with a higher propensity to elect left governments tend to pay higher and more volatile sovereign spreads. We build a sovereign default model with elections between left and right policymakers. Reelection probabilities increase with government spending, with the left having a small advantage (consistent with the data). We use variation in “election efficiency” to create model economies that elect the left more (left leaning) or less frequently (right leaning) in equilibrium. The left‐leaning economy has a higher reluctance for fiscal austerity than the right‐leaning economy, chooses higher government spending, and faces higher spreads, resulting in lower welfare.