The Crowding-In Effect of Public Information on Private Information Acquisition
研究发现公共信息传播可以激励知情交易者获取私人信息，产生挤入效应，与挤出现象共同导致私人信息需求呈驼峰形曲线，并解释了免费与付费信息共存的原因。
Abstract The dissemination of public information regarding an asset’s fundamental value can encourage the acquisition of private information by informed traders, leading to a crowding-in effect. Competing with the crowding-out effect analyzed in prior research, the crowding-in effect shapes the demand for private information in a hump-shaped curve against public information quality. I examine how a for-profit information seller strategically provides information, exploiting this hump-shaped demand curve, and offer theoretical support for the coexistence of free and paid information. The model yields distinctive insights into the equilibrium information structure and market quality when the crowding-in effect drives public information dissemination.