The Lender’s Lender: Trade Credit and the Monitoring Role of Banks
研究发现，企业作为客户贷款人（通过贸易信贷）时，会因自身贷款银行的监督而限制对客户的信贷集中度，银行通过借款基础公式中的集中度限制影响企业贸易信贷政策。
Abstract A firm’s role as lender to its customers (via trade credit) is influenced by the firm’s own lenders. With a novel data set of trade credit between U.S. public companies, I find that firms limit customer credit concentrations, extending less generous trade credit to customers as the firms’ sales dependence on them increases. Evidence points to lenders influencing firms to limit credit concentrations: First, cross-sectional variation shows stronger results with greater lender monitoring intensity. Second, analysis of granular loan contract details reveals that concentration limits in borrowing base formulas are a clear, previously unexplored way banks influence trade credit policies.