The Cost of Equity: Evidence from Investment Banking Valuations
利用收购监管文件中投资银行披露的股权成本估计，研究了银行如何估算折现率，发现其与贝塔和规模等风险指标相关，但与其他公司特征的关系与学术证据矛盾，且激励因素（如管理层收购中更高的股权成本）会影响估值。
Abstract Using manually compiled cost of equity (COE) estimates disclosed in takeover regulatory filings, we provide novel evidence on how investment bankers estimate discount rates. COE estimates are related to several risk proxies, such as beta and size. Other firm characteristics are unrelated to COE estimates or provide relations contradicting academic evidence. We also explore the role of incentives. For example, banks use significantly higher COEs in management buyouts, which potentially underestimates target value, making the bid more attractive for target shareholder approval.