Auctions versus Negotiations: The Role of the Payment Structure
研究了卖方在支付可包含或有成分时，如何在有较少竞标者的优化谈判与有较多竞标者的拍卖之间做战略选择，发现谈判的优势在于卖方能设定最优支付结构，而协同效应和竞标者估值差异越大，谈判越可能占优。
ABSTRACT We investigate a seller's strategic choice between optimally structured negotiations with fewer bidders and an auction with more competing bidders when payments can have a contingent component, as is common in mergers and acquisitions (M&A), patent licensing, and employee compensation. The key factor favoring negotiations is that it allows the seller to set her preferred payment structure—that is, the revenue‐maximizing mix of cash and contingent pay; reserve prices are of secondary importance. Negotiations are more likely to dominate if synergies increase in bidders' productivity types (as with acquirer‐target complementarities in M&A). Higher dispersion and magnitude of bidders' private valuations also favor negotiations.