Do Apprenticeship Norms Encourage Supervisors’ Audit Quality Enhancing Behaviors?
研究审计中的学徒模式如何影响主管审计师的行为，发现激活学徒规范能提升样本选择质量，并在客户压力下改善后续测试质量，但对工作生活冲突的负面效应无缓解作用。
ABSTRACT The audit environment operates using an apprenticeship model, where more experienced auditors are responsible for the training and development of junior auditors. Academic research has investigated this model primarily as a quality control mechanism for the subordinate’s work product. In contrast, we investigate what effect the apprenticeship model has on supervising auditors. We theorize that coaching an apprentice activates norms that are accompanied by an ideal audit quality focus. In an experiment with experienced auditors, we find that salient apprenticeship norms result in a higher-quality sample selection. Although work-life conflict has an overall negative effect on quality, we find no evidence that apprenticeship norms attenuate this effect. Finally, auditors faced with client pressure improve the quality of their subsequent inventory testing selections only when apprenticeship norms are salient. Our findings expand our understanding of the ways the traditional audit environment encourages quality behavior, with important implications for research and practice.