Quality signaling and demand for renewable energy technology: Evidence from a randomized field experiment
在塞内加尔的随机实地实验中，研究了三种质量信号（退款保证、第三方认证、保修）对高质量太阳能灯需求的影响，发现认证和保修能提高支付意愿，但价格仍低于市场价，且有效信号会刺激低质量产品需求。
Solar technologies have been associated with private and social returns, but their technological potential often remains unachieved because of persistently low demand for high-quality products. In a randomized field experiment in Senegal, we assess the potential of three types of quality signaling to increase demand for high-quality solar lamps. We find no effect on demand when consumers are offered a money-back guarantee but increased demand with a third-party certification or warranty, consistent with the notion that consumers are uncertain about product durability rather than their utility. However, despite the higher willingness to pay, the prices they would pay are still well below market prices for the average household, suggesting that reducing information asymmetries alone is insufficient to encourage wider adoption. Surprisingly, we also find that the effective quality signals in our setting stimulate demand for low-quality products by creating product-class effects among those least familiar with the product. • Quality signals have the potential to increase demand for off-grid solar technology. • Money-back guarantee has no effect on the demand for high-quality solar lamp. • Third-party certification and 2-year warranty increase willingness to pay by 12–14 %. • Effective quality signals also stimulate demand for uncertified low-quality product.