通缩陷阱、代理人信念与财政货币政策

Deflationary traps, agents’ beliefs and fiscal–monetary policies

Economic Theory · 2025
被引 0
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了代理人有限认知能力与财政货币政策如何共同导致通缩陷阱,发现通胀目标、政府债务稳定关注度及代理人学习意愿显著影响零利率下限风险。

Abstract

Abstract We study the role of agents’ limited cognitive capabilities, combined with fiscal and monetary policies, in the generation of a deflationary trap. In order to do so, we employ a heterogeneous expectations New Keynesian model in which the agents’ forecasts are based on simple heuristics. Thanks to a learning mechanism, the model is able to generate endogenous changes in agents’ beliefs that we prove to have a crucial role in the characterization of a deflationary trap. We show that the probability of hitting the zero lower bound on the interest rate, and potentially entering a deflationary trap, is not only affected by the inflation target set by the central bank. This probability is also influenced by the governments’ focus on public debt stabilization and by the agents’ memory and willingness to learn. We also show that the impact of these factors is very significant for inflation targets in the range 0–3%, while an inflation target of $$4\%$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:mrow> <mml:mn>4</mml:mn> <mml:mo>%</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:math> isolates the system from the zero lower bound problem.

通缩陷阱异质性预期财政货币政策零利率下限