An experimental investigation of lobbying and bribes
通过实验研究贿赂和游说如何扭曲裁判对工人绩效的判断及奖金分配，发现两者影响不同：游说增加获奖人数，贿赂则削弱绩效与成功的关系，使奖金主要流向行贿者。
Abstract How do bribes and lobbying distort judgment? In our experiment, referees are tasked with judging a worker’s performance, and awarding a bonus to workers who score above a certain threshold. We find that bribes and lobbying are both distortionary, but in different ways. Whereas lobbying increases the number of workers receiving a bonus, bribes weaken the relationship between performance and success, with bonuses mostly being awarded to workers who bribe. We discuss implications for anti-corruption interventions.