Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? Evidence from Corporate Tax Windfalls
利用2017年《减税与就业法案》带来的一次性税收损益，研究发现监督较弱的CEO会因税收意外收益获得补偿，但不会因相应损失受到惩罚，这更符合租金攫取的解释。
ABSTRACT Focusing on the one‐off tax gains and losses (i.e., windfalls) associated with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, we reexamine whether CEOs are rewarded for luck. We find that weakly monitored CEOs are compensated for the windfall tax gains but not penalized for the corresponding tax losses. No such pattern is observed for CEOs facing greater pay scrutiny. The pay for windfalls cannot be explained as rewards for CEOs’ efforts, talents, political activities, or as firms sharing their tax gains with all executives. The results are more consistent with rent extraction by CEOs facing weak pay scrutiny.