An anatomical review of the common pool resource game
这篇综述梳理了过去四十年公共池资源博弈实验文献，总结环境假设（如群体规模、资源大小）和制度因素（如沟通、信息、监管）对资源过度开采的影响，为后续研究提供指导。
Abstract Over the last four decades, a broad stream of experimental literature has been published using the Common Pool Resource (CPR) game to study how people react to congestible resources, and how to keep such resources from socially harmful overexploitation. With the goal of providing guidance to future work on this still-important paradigm, we provide a narrative review of the literature, summarizing the results for several key aspects of the experimental operationalization. We classify these aspects into two broad categories. The first describes ‘environmental’ assumptions on the modeled resource problem itself. This refers to aspects of the experimental environment reflecting factors such as group size, resource size and asymmetry of access, which generally constitute the nature of the dilemma. The second category involves ‘institutional’ issues related to how people might solve the problem, such as user communication between subjects, information about previous subjects’ choices, and regulatory measures.