Regulatory capture in the first Spanish Nuclear Program (c.1951-64)?
研究了西班牙从自给自足向自由核管理模式转变过程中，国家电力寡头如何通过监管俘获巩固既得利益，为理解核能政策中的政商关系提供新视角。
Countries adopted the commercial use of nuclear electricity in different forms, with varying corporate strategies and structures. In Spain, the transition from an autarchic to a liberal model of nuclear management consolidated the vested interests of the national electric oligopoly. This article explains this process using a mesoeconomic perspective (inter-institutional dialectic). While the commonly accepted general idea is that reciprocal instrumentation between political and economic interests explains the transition from Franco’s autarky to developmentalism, we conclude that the theory of regulatory capture is a more accurate explanation, at least in the first phase of development of the Spanish nuclear program. In fact, the banking electricity oligopoly’s capture of the Spanish state was a distinct variety of its energy policy in international comparative terms.