Raising Capital from Investor Syndicates with Strategic Communication
研究企业家如何通过设计投资者回报结构，利用投资者间的战略沟通来筹集项目资金，揭示了联合体内部层级和利益冲突的新动机。
ABSTRACT An entrepreneur makes offers to multiple investors to fund a project that requires a minimum investment. Concerned about other investors' decisions, each investor strategically communicates information about the project to others. When investors have conflicts of interest, those with contractually stronger incentives to invest attempt to persuade others to invest. Depending on the project's ex ante quality, the entrepreneur may promise investors different returns to create conflicts of interest and induce persuasion, or may promise investors an identical return to align their interests and induce truthful communication. The paper illustrates a new motivation for syndication and hierarchy within syndicates.