Trying to Please Multiplayer Bosses: How the Subsidiaries of Chinese Multinationals Sell OFDI Initiatives to Their Headquarters
通过多案例研究，揭示中国跨国公司子公司如何运用微观政治策略，说服总部不同层级的管理者批准对外投资方案，并分析市场寻求与战略资产寻求动机下策略的差异。
Abstract How do subsidiaries sell initiatives to their headquarters? Multilayer decision-makers at corporate headquarters, with divergent interests and power, can overly complicate the acceptance process. We present a multi-case study to explore how subsidiaries of a Chinese multinational enterprise convince top management teams and department heads at their corporate headquarters to engage in foreign investments. Building on a micropolitical perspective, we develop a process model of subsidiary micropolitical strategy adoption consisting of (a) political tension retrieval regarding divergent interests and power at corporate headquarters around specific initiatives, (b) selective coalition building whose interests and power are aligned with the initiatives, and (c) a transitive relation leveraging strategy based on the ties of allied headquarters' managers. We further reveal the interplay between corporate motivations (i.e., market seeking vs. strategic asset seeking) and specific micropolitical activities adopted by subsidiary managers. We enhance the understanding of micropolitics in subsidiary initiatives by underscoring how to strategically manage differences among multilayer actors at corporate headquarters. Additionally, we reveal a political view of foreign investment decision-making in addition to rationality.