How does political uncertainty affect the optimal degree of policy divergence?
研究了选举中两种不确定性（政策相关和候选人特定）如何影响两个政策平台间最优分歧程度，发现候选人特定不确定性足够大时政策趋同最优，且只有纯粹职位导向的政党才会导致趋同。
Abstract We examine how the optimal degree of policy divergence between two policy platforms in an election is affected by two types of aggregate uncertainty: policy-related and candidate-specific. We show that when the candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large, policy convergence becomes optimal. We also show that when these two types of uncertainty co-exist, only purely office-motivated parties result in policy convergence, in other words, any level of policy motivation of parties results in some policy divergence, making policy motivation undesirable when candidate-specific uncertainty is sufficiently large.