GDP Manipulation, Cost of Equity, and Firm Performance
利用卫星夜间灯光数据估算中国各省GDP操纵程度，发现GDP操纵越严重的省份，当地企业股权资本成本越高、投资效率越低、利润增长越弱；官员意外更替减少操纵后，企业成本下降、绩效改善。
ABSTRACT We use satellite night light data to estimate the extent of gross domestic product (GDP) manipulation in China and investigate the impact of such manipulation on local firms. Firms located in provinces with higher levels of GDP manipulation experience a higher cost of equity, lower investment efficiency, and weaker profit growth. Using a difference‐in‐difference test, we show that the cost of equity decreases and firm performance improves following unexpected turnovers of top government officials, which significantly reduces GDP manipulation. Additionally, our findings suggest that local firms may collude with government officials in costly data manipulation. We show that firms in provinces with higher levels of GDP manipulation receive more government subsidies, and that firms with lower pay–performance sensitivity (PPS) are more likely to collude.