The Fed's Discount Window in “Normal” Times
研究了2010-2019年金融市场相对平静时期银行使用美联储贴现窗口的行为，发现借款与资产负债表构成紧密相关，储备较少、负债成本高且脆弱、抵押品流动性差的银行更可能借款。
ABSTRACT We study banks' use of the Fed's discount window during a time of relative calm in financial markets. We merge transaction‐level data on discount window borrowings with quarterly bank balance sheet information between 2010 and 2019. We develop a model of the borrowing decisions of banks and contrast its implications with the data. In line with the model, we find that discount window borrowing is tightly linked to the composition of banks' balance sheets. Importantly, banks holding less reserves are more likely to borrow from the discount window, as are banks with more expensive and fragile liabilities, and less marketable collateral.