Stakeholder Orientation, Product Market Competition, and the Cost of Equity
研究了采纳利益相关者法规如何影响股权成本，发现在高竞争行业降低股权成本、增加现金流和抗风险能力，在低竞争行业则相反。
Abstract By examining required rates of return, we study how shareholders perceive stronger stakeholder orientation arising under the adoption of constituency statutes. Constituency statutes decrease (increase) the cost of equity for firms operating in high- (low-) competition industries. For firms in high-competition industries, constituency statutes increase future cash flows and performance resilience to negative industry downturns, suggesting that constituency statutes facilitate CSR activities for product differentiation in competitive industries. In contrast, for firms in low-competition industries, constituency statutes reduce future cash flows and increase tail risks, suggesting that constituency statutes shield managerial agency problems from discipline.