Public Debt in a Federal State: Warnings From Belgium
研究了比利时1970年以来的公共债务动态，发现联邦与地方实体间的互动导致债务高企，并分析了政治与宪法机制的影响，提出了打破债务循环的政策选项。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the dynamics of public debt in a fiscal federation, with a focus on Belgium from 1970 onwards. Lately, the institutions responsible for monitoring Belgium's fiscal situation have been issuing increasingly alarming alerts regarding the sustainability of the current budget deficits. We show that Belgium has experienced a cycle of high public debt and claim that the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the interplay between the different political or geographical entities in the federation. We examine whether the different entities exhibit free‐riding behavior in public debt creation and find significant fiscal imbalances both at the federal level and at the subcentral level. Multiple political and constitutional mechanisms are identified as potential drivers. Furthermore, the paper presents and discusses several policy options for breaking the cycle of high public debt: a new state reform, fiscal rules, a no‐bailout clause, and an insolvency framework.