International Corporate Development Activities and Information Disclosures in Earnings Calls
研究了企业的国际联盟和收购如何加剧信息不对称，以及高管和分析师在盈利电话中如何通过互动来应对这种不对称。
Abstract We examine firms’ international alliances and acquisitions and their implications for firms’ corporate communications in earnings calls. Building upon and extending existing research, we argue that international alliances and acquisitions directly augment the information asymmetry problem between firms and capital markets. By delving into how executives and analysts interact to address asymmetries in information during earnings calls, we bring new attention to financial markets as an important factor market in research on internationalization. Findings from detailed information on executives’ information disclosures as well as analysts’ questions provide evidence on how international corporate activity affects the way in which firms engage with capital markets and the investing public.