Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
从认识论角度研究不对称信息下社会选择函数的实施问题，假设参与者自私但可能相信他人诚实，在信息多样性条件下证明任何激励相容的社会选择函数都可唯一实施。
Abstract We investigate the implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information concerning the state from an epistemological perspective. Although agents are either selfish or honest, they do not expect other participants to be honest. However, an honest agent may exist not among participants but in their higher-order beliefs. We assume that “all agents are selfish” never happens to be common knowledge. We show a positive result in general asymmetric information environments, demonstrating that with a minor restriction on signal correlation called information diversity, any incentive-compatible social choice function, whether ethical or nonethical, is uniquely implementable in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.