Implicit Promises and the Timing of Defined‐Benefit Pension Plan Freezes
研究发现企业在CEO更替后冻结固定收益养老金计划，以保护CEO的退休福利不受成本削减影响，揭示了企业通过时机选择兑现对CEO的隐性养老金承诺。
ABSTRACT Firms time defined‐benefit (DB) plan freezes after CEO turnovers to protect CEO retirement benefits from cost cuts affecting the wider workforce. We document a significant increase in voluntary CEO turnovers just before the freeze, without notable post‐freeze changes. Our results suggest that firms prioritize retaining their CEOs and avoiding reputational costs over cost‐cutting measures that could negatively impact their top talent. Overall, the study uncovers the timing of the freeze as a strategy that firms use to honor pension promises to their CEOs and informs the academic debate on the relation between DB plans and employee mobility.