Between Government and Market: The Political Economics of Labor Unions
综述了工会作为政治行动者在政治经济中的最新研究，涵盖其外部政治影响（如投票、游说）和内部组织（如代表、偏好聚合），特别关注公共部门工会及弱制度环境下的行为。
We survey and summarize recent literature on labor unions in political economy. While labor unions have been a long-standing subject of study in labor and macroeconomics, until recently they have been less studied by political economists, despite being important political actors in many policy-relevant contexts. We first organize the literature on the external influence of unions on the political system, including effects on voting, campaign finance, lobbying, and intraparty bargaining. We then discuss work on the internal politics and organization of unions, including issues of selection, representation, and union aggregation of preferences. We pay special attention to the economic and political effects of public sector unions. We also discuss union behavior in weakly institutionalized contexts, where crime, corruption, rent-seeking, political strikes, and violence are all issues. We conclude with directions for future work.