Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits
提出一个银行理论，认为银行无法完全控制存款流动，存款在降低融资成本的同时，当银行资本不足时可能因增加杠杆而带来负面价值，为杠杆监管和低利率环境下的银行业提供新视角。
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low‐interest‐rate environment.