Agent-Agent Conflict: Outside Directors and Co-CEOs in Family Firms
解释了为何在联席CEO领导下的家族企业中，外部董事尤其有益。通过提出代理人与代理人之间的冲突，并假设委托人机会主义，预测外部董事在混合联席领导（家族与非家族联席CEO）及创始家族后代时期更有价值。对意大利家族企业出口的分析支持了假设。
This study explains why outside directors in family firms are especially beneficial when co-CEOs are at the helm. Extending agency theory beyond the principal-agent and the principal-principal conflicts, it proposes a refined agent-agent conflict that arises when multiple co-CEOs run the firm. Assuming the principal opportunism, it predicts that outside directors will be beneficial under co-leadership, particularly under mixed co-leadership (i.e., comprising family and non-family co-CEOs) and family generations after the first. An analysis of Italian family firms’ export supports the hypothesized effects. The theoretical implications are discussed and have significance for research on both family businesses and agency theory.