Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar
研究了CEO是否利用股票回购在高价时卖出股权，发现公司日历（财报发布和内部交易限制时间表）能解释回购与股权薪酬的重合，且内部治理强或外部监督高的公司更严格遵循该日历。
We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar—the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.