Free Entry in a Cournot Market with Overlapping Ownership
研究了现有企业间交叉持股对市场进入决策的影响，发现交叉持股通常通过弱化竞争、减少进入而损害福利，仅在规模报酬显著递增时才有益。
We examine the effects of overlapping ownership among existing firms deciding whether to enter a product market. We show that in most cases—and especially when overlapping ownership is already widespread—an increase in the extent of overlapping ownership will harm welfare by softening product market competition, reducing entry, and thereby (in contrast to standard results) inducing insufficient entry and magnifying the negative impact of an increase of entry costs on entry. Overlapping ownership can mostly be beneficial only under substantial increasing returns to scale, in which case industry consolidation (induced by overlapping ownership) leads to sizable cost efficiencies.