Persistent Protests
研究了异质性机会成本的公民参与有明确诉求的抗议活动，政府随时间与参与度增加成本，胜利者获得老兵奖励，均衡呈现加入、高峰和退出三个阶段。
A continuum of citizens with heterogeneous opportunity costs participates in a protest with well-defined demands. As long as the government doesn’t concede, it pays a cost increasing in time and participation. Citizens who are part of the victory team enjoy a “veteran reward.” Every equilibrium with protest displays a buildup stage during which citizens join the protest but the government ignores them, a peak at which the government concedes with positive probability, and a decay stage in which the government concedes with some density and citizens continuously drop out. The set of equilibria is fully described by the peak time.