Do Consumers Distinguish Fixed Cost from Variable Cost? “Schmeduling” in Two-Part Tariffs in Energy
利用中国供暖价格改革的准实验，发现消费者未能正确区分固定成本与可变成本，而是表现出“Schmeduling”行为，这影响了能源两部制电价下的福利效应。
A central assumption in economics is that consumers properly distinguish fixed cost from variable cost. This assumption is fundamental to various economic theories, including optimal taxation, redistribution, and price discrimination. Using a quasi-experiment in heating price reform in China, we find empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this conventional assumption and more consistent with the “schmeduling” model in Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004). As we demonstrate its policy implications for two-part energy tariffs, this schmeduling behavior makes fixed costs directly relevant to the perceived relative prices of goods, and therefore alters the welfare implications of price, tax, and subsidy designs.