Aid Sanctions and Hybrid Regimes
研究了制裁有效性是否受目标国政体类型影响，特别是混合政体在制裁下的行为是否更像封闭威权或民主政体，并比较了援助暂停与其他制裁的效果差异。
Recent advances combining sanctions scholarship and the study of authoritarianism relate sanctions effectiveness to regime type. These studies generally conclude that economic sanctions tend to be more effective on democracies than on autocracies, but also on weakly institutionalised autocracies rather than on other authoritarian types. This literature at the intersection between international relations and comparative politics focuses on the democracy-autocracy dichotomy, or the categorization of autocratic types, to the detriment of the exploration of ‘hybrid’ regime types. Equally importantly, it has neglected examining the impact of aid suspensions as a subcategory of sanctions (Nielsen, Citation2013). We address these deficits by investigating whether (i) the autocratic type or the level of democratic openness of the target better predicts sanctions effectiveness, (ii) whether hybrid regimes behave like closed autocracies or like democracies under sanctions, and (iii) whether aid suspensions perform similarly than other sanctions in terms of effectiveness. The hypotheses are tested on an original dataset rich in aid sanctions.