Taken as an Exploiting Tool: When ESOPs Meet Controlling Shareholders' Share Pledging in an Emerging Market
研究发现，控股股东股权质押的公司更可能推行员工持股计划，但这并未提升生产率，反而增加了股价崩盘风险，表明控股股东将员工持股计划用作谋取私利的工具。
ABSTRACT We examine firms' underlying motivation for adopting an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the presence of share pledging (SP) by controlling shareholders. Empirical evidence shows that an SP firm is more likely than a non‐SP firm to adopt an ESOP. Additional analysis suggests that when a firm has an ESOP (conditional on SP), its total factor productivity does not increase. Instead, it engages in more negative news hoarding than a firm without an ESOP in terms of higher stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings suggest that SP controlling shareholders exploit ESOP as a tool for seeking private benefits.