Global emissions, regulatory competition and excess entry
研究环境监管竞争如何影响企业进入，发现排放局部化时严格监管导致进入不足，而全球性排放（如二氧化碳）时正负外部性抵消，实现次优监管和进入水平。
Abstract This study presents a model that relates the efficiency of environmental regulatory competition to excess entry by firms. The two key results are as follows. First, when emissions remain localized, stringent environmental regulation leads to insufficient firm entry owing to negative external effects on the damage caused by emissions in other countries. Second, if emissions spill over globally, akin to CO causing global warming, the impact of emissions on welfare will be uniform across countries. In this case, the positive and negative external effects of tightening regulation cancel each other out, yielding the second‐best levels of regulation and firm entry.