win–win contract farming in dual-channel agribusiness supply chains under yield, quality, and price uncertainty
研究了双渠道蓝莓供应链中基于激励的合同种植模型，通过对比无合同、惩罚型合同和激励型合同，发现激励型合同能实现农户与企业的双赢并提高整体利润。
Despite the benefits of contract farming, power imbalances between farmers and agribusiness firms often result in unfair agreements. This study aims to design a fair (win–win) contract farming model for a dual-channel (fresh and processed) blueberry supply chain , incorporating an incentive mechanism to ensure that all parties benefit. We examine the benefits of incentive-based contracts over penalty-based contracts by analytically investigating three farming situations: (1) no contract, (2) penalty-based contract farming, and (3) incentive-based contract farming. We establish analytical conditions for collaborative incentive-based contract terms that benefit both parties and validate these conditions numerically using data from a representative blueberry farm. Our findings indicate that the incentive-based contract farming leads to mutually beneficial outcomes and higher supply chain profits compared to the penalty-based contract. We conduct numerical and comprehensive sensitivity analyses to assess the impact of contract farming on the profits of the farmer, agribusiness firm, and the overall supply chain. Our study has significant theoretical and practical implications, emphasizing the importance of balanced and mutually beneficial contract farming arrangements that account for yield, price, and quality uncertainties within a dual-channel supply chain.