The Economics of Generic Drug Shortages: The Limits of Competition
研究了美国仿制药市场短缺的经济谜题：短缺时价格不升反降，市场不为可靠供应链支付溢价，原因在于监管和合同摩擦、信息不对称及代理问题，并讨论了政策干预。
We examine the economics of the US generic prescription drug market, which comprises the majority of medicines sold. The market is celebrated for its benefits in the form of high quality and low prices for consumers but is also increasingly challenged by shortages that may disrupt patient care. Shortages in the generic drug market present an economic puzzle — in the face of a shortage, prices should rise, encouraging entry, yet we observe shortages increasing in number and persistence. Moreover, if shortages cause patient harm, why don’t markets pay a premium for a reliable supply chain? We argue that the puzzle can be explained by the inability of generic drug prices to adjust easily due to regulatory and contracting frictions, and the coexisting presence of asymmetric information and agency problems in the US market. We conclude with a discussion of policy interventions aimed at addressing these challenges to ensure resilient US generic drug supply.