Chief executive officer (CEO) Machiavellianism and executive pay.
研究将马基雅维利主义理论融入高管薪酬设定研究，发现高马基雅维利主义的CEO更可能主动谈判并有效运用社会影响策略，从而获得更高薪酬，且其管理团队薪酬也更高。
Integrating theory and evidence about Machiavellianism (Mach) into executive pay-setting research, we theorize about how chief executive officers (CEOs) higher in Mach may be both more motivated to initiate negotiations and more effective in utilizing social influence tactics in the pay-setting process, thus positively relating to their own pay outcomes. Specifically, we first theorize that CEO Mach positively associates with a CEO's total pay and severance pay. Moreover, because paying top management team (TMT) members more is also in CEOs' interests-such as to help build TMT loyalty and cooperation, aid hiring, and ease retention while also narrowing the CEO-TMT pay differential to thus provide an impetus for a CEO pay raise-we argue that CEO Mach positively relates to TMT pay as well. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 500 firms and clinical psychologists trained to assess CEO Mach from publicly available data, we find evidence supporting our theorizing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).