Assigning Default Position for Digital Goods: Competition, Regulation, and Welfare
分析了搜索引擎等数字产品默认位置的分配方式，发现竞标中高质量企业虽胜出却因利用消费者转换成本而降低效用，监管增加对手默认份额短期会提高利润但损害消费者。
ABSTRACT We analyze alternative ways to assign the default position for digital goods like search engines. When two competing firms vie for the default through bidding, the higher‐quality firm typically wins but delivers lower utility than the rival due to heightened monetization from exploiting consumer switching costs. The distribution of consumer switching costs plays a crucial role in driving the bidding outcome and welfare results. Paradoxically, increasing via regulation the rival's default share tends to raise profit and harm consumers, at least in the short run. Letting consumers choose the default benefits them in the short run, but harms the weaker firm.