How Are Firms Sold? The Role of Common Ownership
研究发现收购方之间的共同所有权反而增强了企业出售过程中的竞争，共同所有者使目标公司通过拍卖而非谈判出售的可能性提高21.5%，且该效应具有因果性。
Abstract We find that common ownership among acquirers enhances rather than hinders competition in the firm sale process. One common owner raises the likelihood that target firms are sold through auction (vs. negotiation with one buyer) by 21.5%. The effect is causal according to identifications based on mergers between financial institutions. Exploring economic channels, we observe selling firms respond to common ownership among acquirers by avoiding cross-owned acquirers, bargaining hard, and inviting more buyers when cross-owned acquirers initiate the deal but not by terminating the deal. Consistent with enhanced competition, common ownership among acquirers is positively associated with deal quality.