The matching problem with linear transfers is equivalent to a hide-and-seek game
证明具有线性可转移效用的匹配问题可重新表述为两人非零和捉迷藏博弈，推广了冯·诺伊曼的结果，为非TU匹配问题与双矩阵博弈理论之间搭建了新桥梁，有助于计算稳定结果。
Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann . The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge between non-TU matching problems and the theory of bimatrix games, with consequences notably regarding the computation of stable outcomes.